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 1 
Introduction 
 
Transatlantic economic relations are a less widely studied part of the broader subject of transatlantic 
relations. Depending on the political agenda, the focus of attention in the relationship between the 
United States (US) and Europe shifts between policy fields. Since the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in 
New York, differences between the responses of the US and the European Union (EU)2 to the new global 
security situation and the related ‘Global War on Terrorism’ have been most prominent and have 
diverted attention from other policy fields. Therefore widely unnoticed, transatlantic economic 
cooperation – a process that started in the early 1990s – has evolved resulting in the signing of a new 
agreement – the ‘Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration’ (FATEI) – in April 2007. 
 
This paper discusses the new framework agreement giving special attention to the lack of any social 
dimension in the FATEI as well as structural shortcomings in its governance system and overall rationale. 
The institutional setup of transatlantic economic relations will be analyzed on three levels: the 
intergovernmental level (heads of governments and other high-ranking officials), the transgovernmental 
level (lower-level domestic officials and their transatlantic counterparts) and the transnational level 
(private players such as businesses and other civil society organizations).3  
 
What is the transatlantic marketplace and what political relevance does it have? The first part of this 
paper addresses these questions by providing a general overview of transatlantic economic relations. 
This overview includes the scrutiny of core economic data and the analysis of trends in the economic 
relations between the two biggest economic blocks in the world as well as an assessment of the political 
importance of this relationship. 
 
Subsequently, the latest transatlantic agreement FATEI is subject of investigation on the basis of a brief 
outline of the politics of the transatlantic economic relationship between 1990 and 2007. This overview 
will particularly focus on the institutional development of transatlantic relations and the political agenda 
of the partnership. The Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 are 
of crucial importance in this context. 
 
As mentioned above, the lack of any social dimension in the new as well as previous agreements 
determines the angle of inquiry in this paper. First, the link between wider economic relations and social 
standards is established outlining why there should be a social dimension in bilateral economic 
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agreements. Secondly, the limited scope and functionality of transatlantic economic links and 
institutions are discussed and policy proposals for improvements are developed. 
 
The development of transatlantic economic institutions and closer links are highly political matters and 
therefore need strong commitment from the political leadership. This commitment will probably be re-
evaluated when a new US President enters the White House in January 2009. This paper will therefore 
end with some suggestions about how this window of opportunity – before a new US President assumes 
office - could be used to put the transatlantic economic partnership onto a broader footing.
 
 
The Economic Relevance of Transatlantic Economic Relations  
 
Although the political dynamics of transatlantic economic relations are closely linked to the general 
political climate, the core economics of the partnership are not. There is no evidence that the recent 
political frictions in the fields of security and foreign policy have had any significant impact on the 
volume of transatlantic trade and investment.4  
 
This economic stability is to a large extend due to the particular characteristics and sheer size of the 
transatlantic marketplace. The transatlantic economic partnership is the biggest and possibly the most 
important one in the world. Comprising roughly 800 million people, the US and the EU accounted for 56 
per cent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (see Figure 1) and 49 per cent of global trade in goods 
in 2006.5
 
The two biggest economic blocks in the world also show a very high degree of interdependence and 
dynamism in their bilateral trade and investment flows. In terms of trade in goods and services, the 
overall volume has increased significantly since the New Economy crisis at the beginning of this century 
(see Figures 2 and 3). Especially if compared to general GDP growth in the EU (with 15, 25 and 27 
member states) and the US, it becomes clear that transatlantic trade is an important driver of economic 
dynamism and growth. Since 2003, the volume of transatlantic trade has grown roughly three times as 
much as the EU and US economies overall showing again the high and further increasing level of 
interdependence (see Figure 4).
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In terms of Foreign Direct Investment – an indicator for long-term economic interests in the respective 
areas – there is a clear tendency of recovery after the economic crisis a few years ago, although the 
investment levels of the turn of the century have not yet been reached (see Figure 5). 
 
Another important economic factor is consumption. According to data from the World Watch Institute, 
North America (including Canada) and Western Europe (excluding the new Eastern EU member states) 
whilst accounting for only 11.6 per cent of world population were responsible for 60.2 per cent of world 
private consumption of goods and services in 2000.6 This data suggests that although consumption is 
likely to grow faster in the emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere, the combined consumer demand 
of the EU and the US will remain crucial for the world economy in the foreseeable future as many 
emerging economies pursue their development with strategies based on strong exports into the North 
American and European markets.
 
The broad economic indicators presented above show the vital importance of the transatlantic 
marketplace. Most relevant for this paper, however, are the political implications of the transatlantic 
economic relationship. This relationship has internal and external effects. A research report written for 
the US Congress summarized the external effects quite well when the authors concluded that the 
‘combined weight of these two economic superpowers means that how the US and EU manage their 
relationship and the difficult issues involving domestic regulations, competition policy, and foreign 
investment could well help determine how the rest of the world deals with similar issues’.7 In other 
words: within a weak framework of global governance institutions, with World Trade Organization 
(WTO) talks often unsuccessful or deadlocked, the transatlantic relationship has the potential to set the 
rules for international economic activities using the two blocks’ combined powers as biggest producers 
and consumers of goods and services in the world. This external impact is very important and deserves 
further study. In this paper, however, problems related to internal effects are the focus of attention. 
These problems become clear when looking at the development of transatlantic economic relations 
since 1990. 
 
 
From the Transatlantic Declaration (TD) to the FATEI 
 
The roots of transatlantic cooperation can be traced back to the early Twentieth Century. But it was first 
put into the political spotlight with President John F. Kennedy’s ‘Declaration of Interdependence’ in the 
1960s. In a speech in Philadelphia on 4th July 1962, he stated ‘that the United States will be ready for a 
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Declaration of Interdependence, [and] that [the US] will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the 
ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between 
the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded […] 175 years ago’.8 
 
The transatlantic partnership before 1990 was predominately inspired by the Cold War and the shared 
security interests of the US and Western Europe. When the Soviet Empire collapsed, the cohesive force 
of the common enemy subsided and the transatlantic partnership had to be put onto a new basis. At 
this point, the relationship previously dominated by security issues shifted more and more into the 
economic field. 
 
The Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 was the first official agreement in the new era of transatlantic 
relations after the Cold War. It was mainly a statement of shared values, emphasizing that the US and 
the European Union are ‘mindful of their common heritage and of their close historical, political, 
economic and cultural ties’ and ‘recogniz*e] that the transatlantic solidarity has been essential for the 
preservation of peace and freedom and for the development of free and prosperous economies as well 
as for the recent developments which have restored unity in Europe’.9 The Transatlantic Declaration also 
laid the foundation for the institutionalization of the transatlantic partnership. It created 
intergovernmental institutions by establishing: 
 
 bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, on the one 
side, the President of the European Council and President of the EU Commission, and on the 
other side, the President of the United States;  
 bi-annual consultations between the European Union Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, 
and the US Secretary of State, alternately on either side of the Atlantic;  
 ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika10 and the US 
Secretary of State;  
 bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US Government at Cabinet level; 
 briefings, as currently existing, by the Presidency to US Representatives on European Political 
Cooperation meetings at the Ministerial level.11 
 
 
The beginning of a formal institutionalization of the relationship was also necessary as the shift in 
transatlantic relations from security to economic issues was not without problems. These problems are 
rooted in the nature of the post-Cold War global economy that entered a phase of accelerated 
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globalization and growing interdependence in the 1990s. Neo-liberal economic policies became widely 
spread leading to a double-edged situation. As Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at 
Berkeley observed in 1998: ‘Economic globalization in the aftermath of the cold war may be causing 
tariffs, capital controls, and transport costs to decline, but it is also putting firms in the United States and 
Europe into closer competition.’12 He further argued that therefore ‘policies on one side of the Atlantic  - 
be they central bank decisions over the interest rate, congressional and parliamentary decisions about 
the budget, or government decisions about competition and regulatory policy – are having strong 
repercussions on the other. The scope for conflict in such an environment is considerable’.13 
 
The shift from security to economic cooperation thus made the transatlantic partnership more 
complicated. Not only did the basic rationale of the partnership shift to a new policy field, the new field 
was also much more conflict-laden than the shared security interests during the Cold War. The new 
framework not only brought down economic barriers but also highlighted differences in regulatory 
regimes and political preferences, which will be important when the problem of the missing social 
dimension is scrutinized. 
 
The year 1995 brought a major evolution of transatlantic economic relations and the institutionalization 
of the bilateral partnership with the agreement of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). By signing the 
NTA, US President Bill Clinton, EU Commission President Jacques Santer and EU Council President Felipe 
Gonzáles committed to organized cooperation in four key strategic areas: 
 
 Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; 
 Responding to global challenges; 
 Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; 
 Building bridges across the Atlantic.14 
 
In order to address these priority areas effectively, a series of institutional innovations were created in 
the wake of the NTA. As Mark Pollack commented, the ‘establishment of a new and novel institutional 
architecture linking Washington and Brussels across a wide range of issue-areas, represent[ed] the most 
systematic effort at genuine bilateral governance in the history of the transatlantic partnership.’15 The 
NTA complemented the intergovernmental institutionalization of the TD with transgovernmental and 
transnational institutions by creating a variety of civil society dialogues to strengthen bridge-building 
across the Atlantic and more structured networks of lower-level officials. After the NTA, the three level 
structure of transatlantic governance looked as follows:16 
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL: 
 Regular summit meetings between the US President and a delegation of EU officials (mostly the 
EU Commission President and the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers plus the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) 
 
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL: 
 Transatlantic networks of lower-level US and EU officials working on foreign policy and 
especially economic issues. These networks work largely unaffected by the dynamics of 
transatlantic high politics; 
 
TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL: 
 Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) – consisting of European and American Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) lobbying for the liberalization of the transatlantic marketplace; 
 Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) – network of EU and US consumer organizations; 
 Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) – Dialogue of trade unions – (has had only a handful of 
meetings with limited agendas but has not been formally abolished); 
 Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) – Dialogue of environmental stakeholders – 
(ceased to exist in 2001)17; 
 Transatlantic Legislator’s Dialogue (TLD) – created in 1999 as a formal response of the European 
Parliament and US Congress to the NTA commitments, its main aim being to enhance the level 
of discourse between members of the European Parliament and the US Congress.18 
 
Apart from the institutional structure, the political agenda is of vital importance for transatlantic 
relations. When looking at the political mission of the transatlantic partnership in the domain of 
economic policy, the NTA and especially the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) agreement of 
199819 made the political objective very clear: the main purpose of transatlantic economic relations has 
been to bring down tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment. In this sense, the political 
agenda has been ideologically charged carrying the message of trade liberalization and de-regulation. 
This narrow and ideology-laden agenda was not without consequences for the institutional structure. 
 
As indicated above not all institutional innovations were successful. The TAED only had a very short life 
and the TALD, the only institution in the transatlantic setup representing the interests of employees and 
workers in the two largest economies in the world, never played a relevant role and became inactive 
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shortly after its introduction. This meagre outcome however was no coincidence. The narrow political 
agenda made a more active role of the TALD impossible. As Jody Knauss and David Trubek commented: 
‘The fundamental essence of the NTA is the neo-liberal project of transatlantic product and financial 
market integration. The TALD is not a serious effort to moderate the enthusiasm with which this task is 
carried out; nor is it designed to encourage the input of organized labor into these efforts.’20 Hence the 
example of the TALD showed that the narrow political agenda had a dissolving effect on the institutional 
structure. The trade unions simply had no interest in promoting a neo-liberal economic agenda and an 
alternative agenda in a field of interest for the unions was not on offer. 
 
Most of the progress in the 1990s was made in the area of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). But 
as Mark Pollack and Gregory C. Schaffer have made clear: ’In the view of many participants, the “low-
hanging fruit” for economic cooperation had been picked. Governments on both sides now found it 
difficult to move beyond symbolic agreements and rearguard efforts at conflict resolution. Enhanced 
cooperation among regulators had not prevented new and bitter trade disputes from arising.’21 And 
again the connection between the agenda and the institutional structure became clear. Even the TABD, 
the NTA dialogue with the arguably biggest interest overlap with the agenda, nearly ‘ran aground’ when 
it seemed increasingly difficult to deliver progress in the business community’s interest.22 
 
In view of the mutually reinforcing negative effect of an ideologically charged agenda and an agenda-
sensitive institutional structure, it was no big surprise that the results of transatlantic economic 
cooperation were commonly judged as sobering. Therefore, the EU Commission issued a ‘Review of the 
Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States’ in 2004. The report 
pointed out more agenda-setting problems. It criticized that transatlantic economic cooperation had the 
tendency to become overloaded with too many issues in very specific economic sectors and as a result 
failed in prioritizing issues of strategic importance. The ongoing transatlantic disputes about subsidies 
for the aircraft manufacturers Airbus and Boeing for instance were never dealt with by the transatlantic 
institutions. The lack of political ownership was another problem that was detected in the Commission 
report of 2004. Without renewed political commitment at the highest level, the authors of the report 
feared that the more strategic agenda-setting they proposed would be impossible.23 
 
The report also made some detailed suggestions in the specific field of economic relations. It, however, 
failed to identify the destructive consequences of a too narrow agenda. Instead of proposing a 
broadening of the agenda, the authors of the report followed the logic of the existing agenda and 
proposed new mechanisms to bring down non-tariff trade barriers: ‘The need to eliminate them *non-
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tariff trade barriers+ makes it worthwhile to launch something like a “Regulatory Partership Initiative”. 
[…] the goal must be an agreement that commits each side to specific, feasible, market-opening 
measures – including, if necessary, the amendment of primary legislation – without making it hostage to 
other ambitions.’24  
 
Concrete proposals to implement their market-opening proposals were the appointment of high-profile 
‘Regulatory Cooperation Enforcers’ to ensure progress on the economic agenda and the creation of an 
effective early warning system for potential future disputes at early stages of the regulatory and 
legislative processes.25 Effectively, these proposals amount to a transatlantic impact assessment 
evaluating whether a regulatory or legislative proposal would have negative consequences for the neo-
liberal economic agenda pushed by the transatlantic institutions. If this was the case the ‘Regulatory 
Cooperation Enforcers’ could presumably be used to exercise political pressure. 
 
Some of the report’s recommendations were taken on board in the latest important transatlantic 
economic agreement: the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration (FATEI), 
adopted in April 2007. The FATEI brought major novelties on the political as well as the institutional 
level. On the political level, the FATEI represented an important shift of rationale. Additionally to 
reaffirming the shared value basis also emphasized in the previous transatlantic initiatives, the FATEI 
stressed the potential external effects of the transatlantic partnership. It stated that deeper 
transatlantic economic integration ‘will encourage other countries to adopt the transatlantic economic 
model of respect for property rights, openness to investment, transparency and predictability in 
regulation, and the value of free markets’.26  
 
This new awareness of the potential external impact of the transatlantic economic partnership can be 
interpreted as a defensive move in view of rising economic competition, especially from China. As a 
report of the Congressional Research Service made clear: ‘Given quite similar interests in bolstering the 
multilateral trading system, many analysts say that both sides could cooperate more in addressing the 
rising challenge posed by China.’27 The Congressional researchers made a fundamentally important 
point: in view of rising economic challenges, the economic interests (especially external ones) of the EU 
and US are seemingly converging. Although the internal problems in the partnership remain, the 
changing external framework might well drive transatlantic economic cooperation forward. 
 
The continuing institutionalization of the partnership is a further driver for closer integration. In this 
area, the FATEI created the most high profile transatlantic institution to date: the Transatlantic 
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Economic Council (TEC). The TEC represents the new political ownership at the highest level the 2004 
Commission report called for. It is co-chaired by EU Commission Vice President Günter Verheugen and 
Dan Price, Assistant to the US President for International Economic Affairs. Permanent TEC members are 
the European Commissioners for External Relations, Trade as well as Internal Market and Services. The 
US side is represented by the US Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce as well as the US Trade 
Representative.28 The TEC co-chairs also convene a group of advisers ‘consisting of the co-chairs of the 
three existing transatlantic dialogues’29 (TLD, TACD, and TABD). It is interesting to note that the two 
other dialogues founded under the NTA – the TALD and the TAED – are not mentioned at all.  
 
In agenda terms, the work of the TEC focuses on regulatory cooperation in addition to deeper 
integration in the areas of intellectual property rights, trade, financial markets, innovation and 
technology as well as investment.30 Accepting that the easily implementable steps have been made (‘the 
low-hanging fruits have been picked’), deeper regulatory cooperation has the potential to lift the 
transatlantic economic partnership onto a qualitatively new level. Similar to what was called for in the 
2004 Commission report, a ‘High Level EU-US Regulatory Cooperation Forum’ was established to 
‘facilitate early warning about diverging regulatory approaches’.31 Policy-makers on both sides of the 
Atlantic are currently also looking into how their impact assessment mechanisms can be used to identify 
potential regulatory conflicts at an early stage.32 
 
The FATEI brought some major institutional developments on the transgovernmental level of 
transatlantic relations, reinforced the commitment to shared values and added a greater awareness of 
the external leverage of transatlantic economic cooperation. It emphasized again the aim of dismantling 
non-tariff trade barriers and introduced first steps towards an early-warning system in the policy-making 
processes.  
 
But the transatlantic partnership still fails to address strategic issues. It seemed very odd for the second 
TEC meeting, which took place in Brussels on 13 May 2008, to discuss investment policies, accounting 
standards and the assessment of securities regimes without even mentioning the current financial 
crisis.33 Given that the origin of the crisis lies in the US and many of the negative effects materialized in 
Europe, a transatlantic economic council might seem to be the appropriate framework to address these 
issues but it was not to be. 
 
The latest steps to deepen the transatlantic economic partnership also highlighted an important aspect 
that has been completely omitted so far and that becomes increasingly important given the progressing 
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deepening of transatlantic economic cooperation: a social dimension to the economic partnership. The 
rest of this paper will focus on this particular omission. 
 
 
Why should there be a Social Dimension in Transatlantic Economic Cooperation? 
 
The transatlantic political agenda of economic liberalization and regulation adjustment towards the goal 
of harmonizing standards and increasing competitiveness is part of the wider process of neo-liberal 
economic globalization. This can be easily identified in the transatlantic agreements themselves, for 
instance when the FATEI makes direct reference to the ‘transatlantic economy remaining at the 
forefront of globalization’.34 It is now well established that this type of globalization needs reform 
because its purely economic rationale has produced negative social and environmental35 consequences 
in the developing as well as in the developed world.36 
 
Many of these negative consequences can be traced back to the collateral effects of the almost 
dogmatic belief of many political leaders in the benefits of free trade. The reality of economic relations, 
however, is much more complicated than free trade theory assumes. In the real world, many areas are 
politically sensitive to trade, for instance the defense, energy and food industries. And above all the 
gains from trade are highly unevenly distributed between and within countries, producing a large group 
of globalization losers with fewer, very successful, winners.37  
 
In democratic political systems, such an uneven distribution of new wealth creates political backlashes, 
especially in the absence of effective social protection. Or as Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz put it in a 
lecture at the Asia Society in February 2008: ‘We need social protection for those who are going to be 
losing because if we don’t give them the social protection they are going to vote against it 
[globalization]. That’s the point about democracy, if you propose reforms that make most people worse 
off, they are not going to be happy. […] So you have to think of this as a package. And the package that 
we have to be talking about is opening globalization and social protection.’38 Stiglitz alludes to a 
fundamental point: without accompanying social protection, many policies associated with neo-liberal 
globalization are simply not in the interest of the majority of society. 
 
The requirement of more social protection leads to another problem: the very same process of 
economic globalization that has created the abovementioned negative consequences has been 
responsible for increased pressure on different social protection and welfare regimes, especially in 
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Europe.39 In the current economic climate, it has become very difficult to maintain, let alone develop, 
the social protection needed to balance some of the negative effects of globalization. And the political 
reactions Stiglitz referred to are already evident in many countries across Europe, where radical parties 
are benefitting from the political climate of dissatisfaction and disillusionment.40 
 
Under these circumstances, a new social dimension can only be created with strong political 
commitment to moderating the effects of globalization and taking into account social and 
environmental needs additionally to economic interests. If this is not the case, international institutions 
face problems of political ownership and acceptance. There are already examples for this: a large part of 
the reason why the European Union has been struggling to connect to its citizens is exactly because it 
has been unable to balance its economic with a social role. The competencies of the Union 
predominantly lie in the area of (completing) the single market – effectively bringing down national 
barriers to economic freedom. But its social agenda has always lagged behind and resulted in the EU 
being perceived as the Europe of businesses rather than the Europe of citizens.41 This creates a problem 
of political acceptance. 
 
Where does this leave transatlantic economic cooperation? This background indicates that it is crucially 
important how the transatlantic relationship is politically shaped. In its current configuration, 
transatlantic economic cooperation is more likely to reinforce the negative effects of globalization 
because its narrow agenda does not take social and environmental requirements sufficiently into 
account. But this is not engraved in stone. With some political and institutional changes and strong 
political commitment, transatlantic economic cooperation could become a model for integrating 
economic, social and environmental concerns in a bilateral governance framework. 
 
 
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Cooperation 
 
What changes are needed? First, the transatlantic economic partnership needs a strong social 
dimension, which ought to include two aspects: transatlantic agreements should enshrine a social polity 
and should limit their potentially negative impact on different social policies by reforming the political 
agenda and institutional structure. 
 
A social polity for transatlantic economic relations would include the setting of minimum social 
standards in bilateral agreements. This is especially important in view of the potential external effects of 
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transatlantic institutionalization. In contrast to arguments often heard by free traders, there is no strong 
evidence of social standards necessarily rising in the wake of economic growth. This is particularly true 
in the developing world. As Lance Compa of Cornell University wrote in the Washington Post in 2001: 
‘Social justice is not a byproduct of economic growth. We have to choose it and build it into the 
architecture of trade and investment systems. Our elected representatives have to decide if they want 
their constituents to be objects of impersonal trade and investment forces, or if they want to make 
worker and human rights a priority for the global economy.’42 
 
In order to set a positive global example and integrate a social polity, the transatlantic economic 
partnership should take the lead and enshrine social rights. These social standards already exist. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) – a tripartite43 United Nations agency - offers the best existing 
framework with its Decent Work Agenda.44 These minimum ILO standards should be an important part 
of transatlantic agreements. 
 
The second aspect of a social dimension is more complicated and is closely linked to the narrow political 
agenda of eradicating transatlantic market distortions. Geoffrey Denton already recognized the problem 
in a 1999 report for the Trans-European Policy Studies Association: ‘MRAs are primarily concerned with 
health and safety and environmental regulations; whether differences in labour and social standards 
create market distortions that the marketplace should concern itself with is more controversial. But 
worker organisations may insist on compensations for the sacrifices they perceive they make in 
accepting agreements to maintain free flows of trade and investment. To seek to exclude the issue of 
labour and social standards could thus jeopardise political acceptability.’45 Denton revealed two 
fundamental points: first, the question of whether different social standards, including welfare regimes, 
are considered non-tariff trade barriers and should thus be a target for transatlantic harmonization 
efforts. And secondly, he correctly emphasized that wider political ownership is highly unlikely if this is 
the case. 
 
The link between social standards and non-tariff trade barriers makes clear how transatlantic economic 
cooperation could put social policies under even more pressure. How could this pressure be eased? The 
political agenda and the institutional setup of the partnership both need reform. The dissolving effect of 
a narrow political agenda on the institutional structure was examined earlier in this paper. A solution for 
this particular problem could be to turn this mechanism around.  
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The global context makes clear that social and environmental needs must be represented in the 
institutional architecture of transatlantic economic relations. Therefore, the TALD and the TAED – which 
were already introduced with the NTA and disappeared for the reasons given - should be revived and 
play an important role in the institutional setup around the TEC. The dialogues should also be better 
equipped than previously. This includes the creation of jointly funded (small) secretariats, which would 
show political commitment and put the dialogues in a better position to contribute to the transatlantic 
agenda without taking too many resources away from other places. 
 
It has also become clear, that the revitalization of parts of the transatlantic institutional structure only 
makes sense if the political agenda is significantly broadened. The goal of abolishing obstacles to 
economic activity does not need to be abandoned but must be complemented by wider economic, 
social and environmental topics and issues of general strategic importance. This would reform the TEC 
into an institution that truly covers the whole breadth of economic themes and would also be helpful to 
overcome the problem of political ownership, especially on the key transnational level. It would make 
the transatlantic institutions a forum where all relevant aspects of economic life can be addressed and 
not a place where one wonders how the harmonization of financial regulations and standards can be 
discussed without mentioning the biggest financial crisis in decades that originated in one of the partner 
countries.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper discussed the transatlantic marketplace and its political significance. It also identified some 
fundamental issues with the FATEI and its predecessor agreements. Especially the mutually dependent 
dynamics of the political agenda and the institutional structure were examined, explaining why some 
transatlantic dialogues died shortly after they were introduced. This paper also made the case for 
including a strong social dimension as a fundamental pillar of the transatlantic institutional structure and 
made some specific policy proposals. 
 
Implementing these proposals is certainly not an easy task and would require a strong political 
commitment for a new direction in transatlantic economic relations. But what is the alternative? If the 
current design prevails, it will be very hard to achieve further success. As indicated, the easily 
implementable steps have been made and breaking into more sensitive areas will be hard to achieve, 
especially if significant resistance from important societal stakeholders is likely. On the other hand, if the 
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political agenda and institutional structure are broadened and a social polity is enshrined, there would 
be more space for political tradeoffs between stakeholders. This would open up the possibility for 
transatlantic economic relations to take a leading role in formulating governance responses to 
economic, social and environmental issues. 
 
The second half of 2008 is the right time to discuss the future of the transatlantic economic relationship. 
Until the new US President takes office in early 2009, there is a window of opportunity to debate the 
problems currently associated with transatlantic economic relations. It looks as if US politics is more 
open for discussions in the areas of social and environmental policies than it has been for a long time. 
This opportunity should not be missed. 
 
The external circumstances for closer cooperation look quite good. As demonstrated, the transatlantic 
marketplace is by far the most important one in the world today. And the EU and the US rarely miss an 
opportunity to stress their joined cultural heritage and shared commitment to economic and political 
values. Additionally, economic interests seem to be converging in view of rising competition from 
emerging economies. The circumstances look supportive for deeper integration. But this positive 
external scenario can also make failure more costly. The development of transatlantic economic 
relations could be an important indicator for the likelihood of effective global governance regimes also 
including other geographical areas. Or as Dan Price put it at the second TEC meeting: ‘Given the 
foundation of shared values, given what is at stake economically in this shared relationship; […] if our 
two sides can’t get it right on regulatory issues, on liberalization issues, who will get it right?’ Whether 
the EU and the US can get it right remains to be seen. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund  
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Figure 3 
 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: US Data: Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov), EU Data: International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, Trade Data: author’s calculation on the basis of data from the US Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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